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INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS AND THE 
EIGHTH AMENDMENT: SOME THOUGHTS ON 
METHOD AFTER GRAHAM V. FLORIDA 
JAMES I. PEARCE* 
INTRODUCTION 
In Graham v. Florida,1 the Supreme Court of the United States 
decided that imposition of a life without parole sentence (“LWOP”) on 
offenders who committed non-homicide offenses as juveniles2 violates the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.3 The 
petitioner briefs in two cases raising this issue—Graham and Sullivan v. 
Florida—focused on convincing the Court that the LWOP sentence in 
these circumstances contravened the proportionality requirement embedded 
in the Eighth Amendment.4 Moreover, the briefs invoked the Court’s recent 
decision in Roper v. Simmons,5 which held the death penalty for juvenile 
offenders unconstitutional.6 Each brief also contained a fleeting reference 
to how international materials have treated the juvenile LWOP sentence—
three paragraphs in Graham,7 and only one in Sullivan.8 An amicus curiae 
brief submitted by Amnesty International presented a more fully developed 
argument that the Court should look to international materials, and in so 
 
 * Duke University School of Law, J.D. and LL.M in international and comparative law expected 
2011; Yale University, B.A. 2003. For comments and suggestions, I thank Professor Joseph Blocher, 
Sunny Kim, Pia Naib, and Emily Eidenier Pearce. This Note is dedicated to Isabel Amina Pearce. 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 2. The Court also heard argument in Sullivan v. Florida, No. 08-7621 (argued Nov. 9, 2009), 
which posed the same question, but then dismissed the case as improvidently granted. See Sullivan v. 
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2059 (2010). 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 4. See infra Part II for a discussion of the proportionality analysis in the Court’s Eighth 
Amendment capital punishment jurisprudence. 
 5. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 6. In fact, Roper held the death penalty unconstitutional as applied to sixteen and seventeen year-
olds. The Court had already proscribed the use of capital punishment for offenders aged fifteen and 
younger in Thompson v. Oklahoma. 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
 7. Brief for Petitioner at 64-66 Graham v. Florida, No. 08-7412 (July 16, 2009). 
 8. Brief for Petitioner at 55-56 Sullivan v. Florida, No. 08-7621 (July 16, 2009). 
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doing, should hold the juvenile LWOP sentence unconstitutional under the 
Eighth Amendment.9 
Recent years have seen considerable scholarly controversy over 
whether the Supreme Court of the United States, or indeed any American 
court, should use international and foreign law when interpreting the U.S. 
Constitution.10 Much of the controversy followed the Court’s decisions in 
Atkins v. Virginia,11 Lawrence v. Texas,12 and, most recently, Roper.13 The 
justices themselves, perhaps most notably Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia, 
have entered the fray by addressing the issue outside the courtroom in 
debates and public addresses.14 A couple of bills addressing the issue 
 
 9. See Brief for Amnesty International, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Graham 
v. Florida (No. 08-7412), Sullivan v. Florida (No. 08-7612). 
 10. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 
AM. J. INT’L L. 57 (2004); Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and 
Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005); Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 1, (2006); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, 
Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005); Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our 
Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43 (2004); Joan L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a “Wider 
Civilization”: Lawrence and the Rehnquist’s Court’s Use of Foreign and International Law in 
Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283 (2004); Youngjae Lee, International 
Consensus as Persuasive Authority in the Eighth Amendment,  156 U. PA. L. REV. 63 (2007); Michael 
D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 69 (2004); Ganesh Sitaraman, The Use and Abuse of Foreign Law in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 653 (2009); Mark Tushnet, When is Knowing Less Better 
than Knowing More? Unpacking the Controversy over Supreme Court References to Non-U.S. Law, 90 
MINN. L. REV. 1275 (2006); Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 129 (2005); Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
148 (2005). 
 11. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 12. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 13. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 14. Justices Breyer and Scalia famously debated the merits of using foreign and comparative law 
in January 2005 at American University, Washington College of Law. Full Written Transcript of 
Scalia-Breyer Debate on Foreign Law, AM. UNI. (Jan. 13, 2005) http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/ 
news/1352357/posts. [hereinafter Breyer-Scalia Debate]. Other justices have also weighed in. See 
Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (“While 
Congress, as a legislature, may wish to consider the actions of other nations on any issues it likes, this 
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on 
Americans.”) (emphasis in original); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. 
to be Chief Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th CONG. 199-201, 
292-93 (2005); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th CONG. 370-71, 
470-72 (2005); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Keynote Address at the 
Ninety-Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: A Decent Respect to the 
Opinions of Humankind: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Interpretation (Apr. 
1, 2005), in 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 351 (2005); Julia Salvatore et al., Comment, Sotomayor and 
the Future of International Law, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 487 (2009) (surveying Justice Sotomayor’s 
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briefly appeared in Congress, although neither secured enough votes for 
passage.15 
Rather than engage in wide-ranging debate about the place of 
international materials16  in constitutional interpretation, this Note focuses 
on the narrower question of how courts could consider international and 
comparative law in the analysis of cruel and unusual punishment under the 
Eighth Amendment.17 Could is a purposefully chosen word. In a debate 
marked by strong—and conflicting—normative claims as to the propriety 
of using international materials in constitutional interpretation,18 the focus 
here is on method, not appropriateness. To the extent this Note makes a 
normative claim, it is this: if American courts are to consider international 
materials when deciding the constitutionality of a given punishment under 
the Eighth Amendment, they should do so in a principled manner, or not at 
all. Developing such a principled manner—and applying it to the Graham 
case—is this Note’s contribution to the ongoing debate about the use of 
international materials in American constitutional interpretation. 
In the spirit of moving the debate beyond generalities about foreign 
law and American constitutional interpretation,19 this Note focuses 
narrowly on the Eighth Amendment. The decision to focus on the analysis 
of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment is not 
arbitrary. Looking in particular at the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence, 
Part I justifies reference to international materials as part of the Eighth 
Amendment analysis on two grounds. First, both the relevant constitutional 
text and the text of the standard most commonly applied to such analysis 
permit—and arguably envision—consideration of international materials. 
Second, the Court has now developed a body of Eighth Amendment 
 
speeches, decisions and confirmation hearing statements about the use of foreign law in domestic 
interpretation). 
 15. See H.R. RES. 568, 108th CONG. (2004); S. RES. 92, 109th CONG. (2005) (arguing that 
reliance on foreign judgment and judicial interpretations is inappropriate). 
 16. “International materials” is used here and throughout the Note as shorthand for both 
international and comparative law. Part IV infra discusses such materials in greater detail. 
 17. For an exhaustive typology of how international materials are used in constitutional 
interpretation, see generally Sitaraman, supra note 10 (dividing different uses of foreign law in 
constitutional interpretational into “unproblematic,” “potentially problematic,” and “troublesome”). 
 18. For a useful overview of the positions in the normative debate, see Sitaraman, supra note 10, 
at 658-64 (identifying arguments supporting and opposing the use of international materials in 
American constitutional interpretation rooted in the theory of liberal democracy and in concerns about 
accuracy). 
 19. Cf. Lee, supra note 10, at 67 (“We have reached a point in the debate where no further 
advance seems likely so long as we continue to speak in general terms about the desirability of citing 
foreign laws.”). 
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precedent in which international materials have played some, even if not a 
clearly identifiable, role. 
Part II addresses what is arguably the most difficult problem: how to 
incorporate international materials into Eighth Amendment analysis. Again 
focusing on the line of death penalty cases, this Part discusses three ways 
that consideration of international materials can enter the analysis. First, 
such materials can be considered as part of the Court’s inquiry into the 
“objective indicia of consensus.”20 Second, the Court can consider the 
relevance of international materials as part of “the exercise of [its] 
independent judgment” as to the appropriateness of the punishment in the 
context.21 Finally, international materials can be used to confirm a domestic 
consensus.22 This Part also briefly considers advantages and shortcomings 
to these different approaches. Ultimately, this Part concludes that the most 
appropriate point in the analysis for consideration of international materials 
is the Court’s independent judgment. 
Because this conclusion raises the troubling specter of judges cherry-
picking their favorite international materials (and avoiding those they do 
not like), Part III borrows from recent scholarship to propose two principles 
for use of international materials in Eighth Amendment analysis of cruel 
and unusual punishment.23 Most basically, this part argues that the Court 
should focus on both the law and practice surrounding a given norm in a 
foreign jurisdiction and then examine if and how the United States has 
responded to such a norm. This argument implicates institutional 
competence and ultimately suggests that the Court should either use 
international materials well, or not use them at all. By way of example, this 
Part analyzes—and finds wanting—the Court’s use of international 
materials in Roper. 
Part IV then discusses how the approach outlined in Part III should 
have been applied to the juvenile LWOP sentences as presented in the 
Graham case. This application shows that while foreign jurisdictions have 
overwhelmingly rejected the juvenile LWOP sentence, the United States 
has regularly lodged its intention to opt-out of international treaties or 
 
 20. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 564. 
 21. Id. 
 22. This is how Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion in Roper described the role of international 
materials. See id. at 605 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“ . . . [T]he existence of an international consensus 
of this nature can serve to confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American 
consensus.”); The majority’s invocation of the confirmatory role of international materials is less clear. 
See infra note 103. 
 23. See Cleveland, supra note 10, at 104-24. 
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treaty provisions that proscribe the juvenile LWOP sentence.24 
Accordingly, a principled consideration of international materials in these 
cases should in fact not sway the Court towards or away from upholding 
the constitutionality of the juvenile LWOP sentence. However, such a 
consideration, while not affecting the result in Graham, would have lent 
clarity to the Court’s treatment of international materials for the analysis of 
what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment. 
Finally, in examining the Court’s recent use of international materials 
in Graham, Part V concludes that the Court missed an opportunity to 
clarify the proper role of such materials under the Eighth Amendment cruel 
and unusual punishment analysis. Indeed, the dissent’s response to the 
majority’s use of international materials illustrates the ongoing confusion.25 
More specifically, this Part notes that while the Court did briefly attempt to 
consider both the law and practice of the juvenile LWOP sentence in 
foreign jurisdictions, it almost entirely ignored the United States’ response 
to the “global consensus”26 regarding the juvenile LWOP sentence. This 
approach not only opens the Court to further criticism regarding the 
selective use of international materials, it also fails to provide guidance on 
a contentious methodological question. 
I. TEXT AND HISTORICAL METHOD: INTERNATIONAL 
MATERIALS AND EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
Because the “basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is 
nothing less than the dignity of man,”27 courts need not feel uncomfortable 
in looking further afield to understand the parameters of cruel and unusual 
punishment as compared to other areas of constitutional law. Justice 
Blackmun, shortly before his retirement, argued that “[i]nternational law 
can and should inform the interpretation of various clauses of the 
Constitution, notably the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.”28 While some scholars 
have argued that international and foreign law has informed constitutional 
 
 24. This is analogous to, though not the same as, the claim that the United States has been a 
persistent objector under customary international law. For a further discussion of customary 
international law, see infra Part IV.B. 
 25. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2045-46 (Thomas, J. dissenting). 
 26. Id. at 2033 (majority opinion). 
 27. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). 
 28. Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39, 45 (1995). 
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interpretation since the founding and should continue to do so,29 others, 
including notably Justice Scalia, take issue with this approach.30 
This Part briefly suggests two reasons why consideration of 
international practice is reasonable in Eighth Amendment analysis. In 
doing so, it makes no larger claims about the appropriateness of applying 
international materials more generally in constitutional interpretation.31 
First, the relevant constitutional text does not cabin inquiry to specifically 
domestic sources and, given its deep historical resonance, arguably 
envisions a more expansive construction. Moreover, not only the language 
of the Eighth Amendment itself, but also the language of the standard most 
frequently applied to it in constitutional analysis—namely, that it inquires 
into the “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society”32—similarly suggests a broad interpretation. Second, the 
Court has, since its decision in Trop v. Dulles, consistently looked to 
international materials to interpret the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on 
cruel and unusual punishment. Thus, through its consistent inquiry into 
international materials in Eighth Amendment cases, the Court has arguably 
developed such inquiry into a methodological precedent. At the very least, 
it has suggested that such inquiry can be appropriate. 
A. Constitutional Texts 
The Eighth Amendment’s command is succinct: “Excessive bail shall 
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.”33 The Court has long recognized that the 
Amendment’s broad language does not lend itself to easy interpretation,34 
and that such language does arguably suggest a broad inquiry.35 Indeed, 
 
 29. See generally Cleveland, supra note 10. 
 30. See, e.g., Breyer-Scalia Debate, supra note 14 (Justice Scalia noting that he “do[es] not use 
foreign law in the interpretation of the United States Constitution”). 
 31. This is not to say that the use of international materials in constitutional analysis may not be 
appropriate. Indeed, in certain cases, such materials are not only appropriate, but necessary. See, e.g., 
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491(2008) (interpreting whether a judgment of the International Court of 
Justice is directly enforceable as domestic law). The argument here is that the appropriateness of 
applying international materials in a given area of constitutional law is best assessed on a case-by-case 
basis, focusing, as Roper suggests, on text, history, tradition, precedent and “due regard for . . . purpose 
and function in the constitutional design.” See Roper, 543 U.S. at 560. 
 32. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. 
 33. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 34. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910) (“What constitutes a cruel and unusual 
punishment has not been exactly decided.”); see also Trop, 356 U.S. at 99 (“The exact scope of the 
constitutional phrase ‘cruel and unusual’ has not been detailed by this Court.”). 
 35. Cleveland, supra note 10, at 70 (“The constitutional text . . . is reasonably read as inviting 
consideration of international values.”). 
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understanding what constitutes “cruel” or “unusual” under the Eight 
Amendment “may warrant consideration of what practices have been 
outlawed under international treatises and customary law” as well as 
“consideration of how common, or uncommon, a particular practice is.”36 
The Court in Trop suggested in part that a broad reading of cruel and 
unusual punishment can be attributed to its deep historical roots. Noting 
that the principle is drawn specifically from the English Declaration of 
Rights of 1688 and more generally from the Magna Carta, the Court 
underscored the Amendment’s role in ensuring that the State’s power to 
punish “be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.”37 Whether 
intentionally or not, this formulation evokes the third source of law 
recognized under the International Court of Justice’s Statute: “the general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”38 
Beyond the Eighth Amendment’s text, the Court’s holding in Trop 
that the “Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards 
of a decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”39 articulated a 
standard that has become, arguably, a subsidiary constitutional text.40 As 
with the actual constitutional text, this standard speaks expansively, and 
can be seen to invite consideration of international law and practice.41 The 
fact that the Court in Trop promptly applied this standard by looking at 
international materials buttresses the argument that such international 
inquiry is appropriate.42 
 
 36. Id. at 70-71. 
 37. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 100. Justice O’Connor noted similar language in Roper when discussing 
the role of international materials in Eighth Amendment analysis. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 604-05 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“This inquiry [into international and foreign law] reflects the special 
character of the Eighth Amendment, which, as the Court has long held, draws its meaning directly from 
the maturing values of civilized society.”) (emphasis added). 
 38. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(c), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 3 
Bevans 1179. 
 39. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. 
 40. Certainly not all the justices would agree that the Trop standard deserves to be described as a 
subsidiary constitutional text. Justice Scalia has expressed that he detests the “evolving standards” 
phrase. See Breyer-Scalia Debate, supra note 14. The description of the phrase as a subsidiary 
constitutional text is meant as an indication of how deeply embedded in constitutional interpretation the 
phrase has become, not a normative claim as to whether the standard should be used. 
 41. Cf. Cleveland, supra note 10, at 70. But see Breyer-Scalia Debate, supra note 14 (Justice 
Scalia arguing that this should apply to “[t]he standards of decency of American society—not the 
standards of decency of the world, not the standards of decency of other countries that don't have our 
background, that don't have our culture, that don't have our moral views”). 
 42. Another reading is of course possible. Unlike in the later death penalty cases in which the 
“evolving standards” test has been applied, Trop considered whether denationalization, as imposed by 
the federal government, constituted cruel and unusual punishment. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 99.  Because 
individual states cannot “make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States,” U.S. CONST., amend XIV, § 1, the Court, with no relevant state-level 
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B. Methodological Precedents: International Materials in Eighth 
Amendment Analysis 
In addition to providing the standard most frequently used in Eighth 
Amendment analysis, Trop v. Dulles also inaugurated the practice of 
consulting international materials. Although the decision in Trop holding 
denationalization a cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment only captured five votes, the more relevant metric for this 
Note is the fact that eight of the nine justices felt it appropriate to refer to 
international materials.43 Writing for a plurality, Chief Justice Warren 
noted that the “civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that 
statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for a crime,” and later 
cited a United Nations Survey indicating that only two countries, the 
Philippines and Turkey, used denationalization as punishment for 
desertion.44 In dissent, Justice Frankfurter argued that “[m]any nations 
impose loss of citizenship for indulgence in designated prohibited 
activities”—although he conceded that the laws mostly applied only to 
naturalized citizens.45 
In subsequent Eighth Amendment cases, and particularly in cases 
deciding whether the application of the death penalty constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment, the Court followed the example set by the Trop 
Court’s lead.46 In Coker v. Georgia,47 the Court held the death penalty as a 
punishment for the rape of an adult woman unconstitutional and noted, 
referring to Trop, that “[i]t is thus not irrelevant here that out of 60 major 
nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty for 
rape where death did not ensue.”48 Five years later, the Court held the death 
penalty unconstitutional for felony murder simpliciter in Enmund v. 
Florida,49 referring to the fact that capital punishment for felony murder 
had been abolished or restricted in Commonwealth countries and 
continental Europe.50 More recently, in deciding the constitutionality of the 
 
legislative enactments, had perforce to look at international materials. By contrast, when the 
punishment in question—the death penalty—is inflicted by the states, the Court appropriately focuses 
its inquiry only on the American standards of decency. Whatever the merits of such a reading, the Court 
has not in fact limited its inquiry in this way. See infra Part II.B. 
 43. See Trop 356 U.S. at 102-03; see also id. at 126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 44. Id. at 102-03 (majority opinion). 
 45. Id. at 126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 46. In Roper, both the majority and Justice O’Connor in dissent note this line of cases. See Roper, 
543 U.S. at 575-76 and id. at 604 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 47. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
 48. Id. at 596 n.10 (citation omitted). 
 49. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
 50. Id. at 796-97 n.22. 
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death penalty as applied to mentally retarded defendants, the Court in 
Atkins v. Virginia51 noted that “within the world community, the imposition 
of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is 
overwhelmingly disapproved.”52 
The Court’s reference to international materials in juvenile offender 
death penalty cases was, until Roper, somewhat less clear. In Thompson v. 
Oklahoma,53 the Court emphasized that its decision that the execution of a 
person less than sixteen at the time of the offense violated the Eighth 
Amendment was “consistent with the views that have been expressed 
by . . . other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by 
leading members of the Western European community.”54 It then surveyed 
these countries in more detail.55 By contrast, the Court’s decision a year 
later in Stanford v. Kentucky56 that permitted the death penalty for 
individuals between ages sixteen and eighteen at the time of the offense 
noted that while international materials could be used to show “‘whether a 
practice uniform among our people is not merely a historical accident,’ . . . 
they cannot serve to establish the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that 
the practice is accepted among our people.”57 The Stanford Court did not 
refer to international materials in the rest of the opinion.58 Most recently, 
the Court returned to considering international materials in Roper, where it 
devoted an entire section of the opinion to such consideration.59 
*** 
Without claiming that the Court—and American courts more 
generally—should use international materials in construing the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, this Part has 
argued that such use is justifiably based in constitutional text and has in 
fact been a part of the Court’s analysis for half a century. Given that 
international materials have thus played a role in constitutional 
interpretation in this area, the next two Parts examine, from different 
perspectives, how they have been and can be used. 
 
 51. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 52. Id. at 317 n.21 (citation omitted). 
 53. 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
 54. Id. at 830. 
 55. Id. at 830-31. 
 56. 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 57. Id. at 369 n.1 (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868-69 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 58. The dissent did call attention to international materials. See id. at 389-90 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
 59. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005). 
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II. METHOD I: INCORPORATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
MATERIALS IN EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS 
This Part explores how consideration of international materials has 
been incorporated, and how it might be incorporated differently, in analysis 
of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The focus 
here—again on death penalty cases—is on the way the Court has set out the 
relevant inquiries and where, within these inquiries, it has considered 
international materials. In examining how the Court has incorporated 
international materials into its Eighth Amendment analysis and how it 
might do so differently, this Part flags advantages and disadvantages to the 
different approaches. The inquiry here is above all methodological. 
Before delving into how the Court has considered international 
materials in death penalty cases, a word about how the Court decides the 
constitutionality of punishments under the Eighth Amendment is 
appropriate. The basic test is one of proportionality, in which the Court has 
been guided by the principles “that the harshness of punishment should not 
exceed the gravity of the crime and that one should not be punished more 
harshly than one deserves.”60 In undertaking this proportionality review, 
the Court engages in a two-part analysis. First, it looks for “objective 
indicia of consensus”61 as to the punishment under consideration. Second, it 
then exercises its “own independent judgment”62 as to the propriety of the 
punishment in light of other factors the Court determines relevant. By 
consulting consensus as well as its own judgment, the Court decides 
whether a given punishment passes constitutional muster under its 
proportionality review.63 
A. International Materials and the Objective Indicia of Consensus 
In all of the post-Trop cases discussed above, the Court has identified 
as part of the Eighth Amendment analysis an inquiry into “objective indicia 
of consensus”64 regarding the punishment at issue. The Court, however, has 
not been consistent on what is appropriately considered as part of these 
objective indicia. As explained below, in some cases the Court has stated 
that only domestic indicia—in the form of state-level legislative enactments 
and jury decisions—are relevant, but has nonetheless considered 
 
 60. Lee, supra note 10, at 72. 
 61. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564. 
 62. Id. 
 63. The Court reiterated the importance of proportionality in Graham. See Graham v. Florida, 130 
S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (“The concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment.”). 
 64. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564. 
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international materials as part of the inquiry. In other cases, the Court has 
suggested a role for international materials in determining a consensus, but 
in one of these cases in particular, it did not in fact appear to consider 
international materials in this way. Nonetheless, where international 
materials have been part of the analysis, they have overwhelmingly been 
considered as part of the Court’s inquiry into the objective indicia of 
consensus on application of the death penalty. 
In three death penalty cases the Court has indicated that the consensus 
inquiry should rely on domestic factors—and then included analysis of 
international materials nonetheless. In Coker, the Court identified as the 
appropriate sources for consideration “history” and the “the objective 
evidence of the country’s present judgment concerning the acceptability of 
death as a penalty for rape for an adult woman.”65 Yet after deciding that 
the “current judgment . . . obviously weighs very heavily on the side of 
rejecting capital punishment” for the rape of an adult woman, the Court 
added a footnote to include a brief consideration of international materials 
as well.66 Similarly, the Court in Thompson described the consensus inquiry 
as including only state legislative enactments and jury determinations,67 
and yet devoted a paragraph and a long footnote as part of this inquiry to a 
consideration of international materials.68 Finally, writing for the majority 
in Atkins, Justice Stevens identified “the country’s legislatures” as the most 
appropriate source of consensus,69 and then buttressed the conclusion that 
consensus had developed against the death penalty for mentally retarded 
offenders by noting that “this legislative judgment reflects a much broader 
social and professional consensus,” including “within the world 
community.”70 
By contrast, two cases suggest that consideration of international 
materials is appropriate to determining objective indicia of consensus. The 
Court in Enmund said so specifically when it included among the relevant 
factors “the historical development of the punishment, legislative 
judgments, international opinion, and the sentencing decisions juries have 
made.”71 It then proceeded to consider the existence and use of capital 
 
 65. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1977). 
 66. Id. at 596 & n.10 (noting that only three out of 60 nations surveyed by the United Nations 
retained the death penalty for rape where death did not ensue). 
 67. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822-23 (1998). 
 68. Id. at 830-31 & n.34 (discussing the use of the death penalty in “nations that share our Anglo-
American heritage” and other “leading members of the Western European community”). 
 69. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 204, 312 (2002). 
 70. Id. at 116-17 n.21. 
 71. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982) (emphasis added). 
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punishment for felony murder in England, India, Canada as well as other 
Commonwealth countries and continental Europe.72 In Roper, the Court’s 
indication that consideration of international materials may be appropriate 
as part of determining consensus is, at best, implicit: “The beginning point 
is a review of objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by 
the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question.”73 In giving 
state legislative enactments the lead role in the analysis, Justice Kennedy 
suggested that such consensus may also be expressed elsewhere—including 
abroad. As noted below,74 however, the Court in Roper used international 
materials to confirm, rather than to determine, its conclusion that the death 
penalty as applied to juvenile offenders was unconstitutional. 
Including consideration of international materials in the “objective 
indicia of consensus” inquiry has a number of advantages. First, and most 
basically, it is where the Court has most frequently incorporated its 
consideration of such materials in past cases.75 Thus, continuing to 
incorporate consideration of international materials at this point in the 
analysis is appropriate as a matter of methodological consistency. Second 
and related to methodological consistency, consideration of international 
materials as part of the consensus inquiry allows litigants to know the role 
such consideration will play in Eighth Amendment cases. Third, because 
determining objective indicia of consensus under the Eighth Amendment 
largely involves what one scholar has called “nose-counting”76—that is, 
determining whether a jurisdiction does or does not permit or use a given 
punishment—it is relatively easy to incorporate such materials by tallying 
up jurisdictions. Finally, including consideration of such materials as part 
of the objective indicia of consensus is both transparent and, as the inquiry 
suggests, objective. 
It is important to underscore shortcomings with incorporating 
consideration of international materials as part of the consensus inquiry as 
well. First, the Court has not been entirely clear as to whether consideration 
of international materials is appropriately part of the consensus inquiry. 
Even in those cases where it has considered such materials, the Court’s 
 
 72. Id. at 796-97 n.22. 
 73. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (emphasis added). 
 74. See infra Part II.C. 
 75. At least the Court has included such consideration in the section of its opinion addressing 
consensus. In both Coker and Atkins, however, the Court appeared to have concluded that such 
consensus existed and then, in a footnote, indicated that international materials confirmed this 
conclusion. Part III.C, infra, discusses this in more detail. 
 76. See Young, supra note 10, at 153. For a more detailed description of this “aggregation” 
problem, see also Sitaraman, supra note 10, at 681-90. 
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articulation of the appropriate inquiry suggests that only domestic factors 
are relevant.77 Second, looking for objective indicia of consensus outside 
the country is arguably undemocratic as it counts noses unaffected by the 
Court’s ruling. On a related point, adding foreign jurisdictions skews the 
proper inquiry and mostly leads to “denominator swelling”—giving the 
impression that greater consensus exists than is actually the case.78 
B. International Materials and the Exercise of Independent Judgment 
In Eighth Amendment analysis, the second inquiry after looking at 
objective indicia of consensus has the Court “determine, in the exercise of 
[its] own . . . judgment”79 whether a given punishment is disproportionate 
in the circumstances. Although the Court is not fully in agreement as to 
whether this inquiry is appropriate,80 the majority of cases, including one of 
the Court’s most recent Eighth Amendment decisions,81 confirm its place in 
the analysis. Indeed, since the Court determined in Coker that “the 
Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought 
to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the 
Eighth Amendment,”82 the Court has, with the exception of Stanford, 
consistently seen fit to assess whether “there is reason to disagree with the 
judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators.”83 
To be sure, the Court has never suggested that consideration of 
international materials falls within its independent judgment. Instead, the 
Court has used this part of the analysis to examine the specific facts of the 
case at hand,84 statistics,85 various social science studies,86 and the social 
 
 77. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 204, 312 (2002); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822-
23 (1998); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1977). 
 78. See Young, supra note 10, at 158-60. 
 79. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005). 
 80. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378 (1989) (“We have no power under the Eighth 
Amendment to substitute our belief in the scientific evidence for the society’s apparent skepticism. In 
short, we emphatically reject . . . that the issues in this case permit us to apply our ‘own informed 
judgment.’”). 
 81. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2650 (2008) (“Whether the death penalty is 
disproportionate to the crime committed depends as well upon the standards elaborated by controlling 
precedents and by the Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s text, 
history, meaning and purpose.”) (emphasis added). 
 82. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977). 
 83. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002). See also Roper, 543 U.S. at 564; Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 (1988); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982). 
 84. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 597-99; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797-98. 
 85. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798-99. 
 86. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 568-74; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-21; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834-36. 
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purposes of capital punishment.87 But if this inquiry is to remain part of the 
Eighth Amendment analysis, it may be a more sensible place, 
methodologically speaking, for consideration of international materials to 
occur. If the Court is to treat such materials as persuasive, and not binding, 
it can arguably engage in a more nuanced assessment of how foreign 
jurisdictions have considered the punishment than it otherwise would as 
part of the “nose-counting”88 under the consensus inquiry. Given the 
specific discretionary grant to the Court to inquire whether “there is reason 
to disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators,”89 
perhaps a thorough-going consideration of international materials may 
provide such a reason. As long as the Court—or any court—is transparent 
in its use of international materials in this part of the analysis, it is unclear 
why such consideration would be less objectionable than reference to social 
science studies and statistics or philosophical inquiries into the larger 
purposes of the criminal sanction.90 
The most troubling aspect of incorporating consideration of 
international materials into the Court’s exercise of its independent 
judgment reflects the controversy this exercise of judgment has 
engendered. Precisely because the Court has not articulated what properly 
falls within the scope of this inquiry, litigants are left guessing what the 
Court may find relevant when exercising its independent judgment in 
resolving a case. As Justice Scalia has emphasized throughout this line of 
cases, this inquiry leaves seemingly unbounded discretion to the nine 
justices.91 Of course, this critique—which has only carried the Court 
once92—applies to the inquiry as a whole, and not more specifically to the 
consideration of international materials. 
 
 87. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-20; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 836-38. 
 88. See Young, supra note 10, at 153. 
 89. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313. 
 90. Justice Scalia argues in dissent in Roper that the Court considers international materials in 
precisely this way and yet fails to be forthcoming about it: “‘Acknowledgement’ of foreign approval 
has no place in the legal opinion of this Court unless it is part of the basis for the Court’s judgment—
which is surely what it parades as today.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in 
original). The argument in this Note agrees with Justice Scalia insofar as he can be understood to 
suggest that if the Court is going to make consideration of international materials a part of its 
independent judgment, it should do so transparently. 
 91. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378 (1989). See also Thompson, 487 U.S. at 873 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 348-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Roper, 543 U.S. at 616 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 92. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 378. 
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C. The Confirmatory Role of International Materials 
The Court’s articulation in Roper of the proper role for international 
materials differed from any previous explanation. The Court devoted the 
entire final section of its opinion to a consideration of international 
materials and did so to confirm its “determination that the death penalty is 
disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18.”93 Justice O’Connor 
dissented because she disagreed that a national consensus against the death 
penalty had formed and disagreed with the imposition of a categorical rule, 
but acknowledged the “confirmatory role” that international materials can 
play in constitutional analysis.94 Thus, Roper arguably initiated a third 
possible way in which international materials can enter the Eighth 
Amendment analysis: as a confirmation of the Court’s conclusion on either 
the consensus or the independent judgment inquiries—or perhaps as 
confirmation of both.95 
At the same time, two of the cases that considered international 
materials as part of the consensus inquiry essentially relegated such 
materials to a confirmatory role, even though the Court did not say this 
explicitly. In Coker, the Court had concluded that while states had not 
unanimously proscribed the death penalty as a punishment for the rape of 
an adult woman, an overwhelming number had “obviously weigh[ed] very 
heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment.”96 It then added a 
footnote that in essence confirmed the Court’s conclusion.97 Similarly, the 
Court in Atkins concluded that “[t]he practice [of executing offenders with 
IQs less than 70] . . . has become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a 
national consensus has developed against it.”98 Only then—and also in a 
footnote—did the Court briefly consider how international materials 
confirmed its conclusion.99 Thus, although the Roper Court was the first to 
articulate the confirmatory role for international materials explicitly, the 
Court’s decisions in Coker and Atkins largely adopted this approach in 
practice. 
 
 93. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575. 
 94. Id. at 605 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“At least, the existence of an international consensus of 
this nature can serve to confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American consensus.”). 
 95. As noted, Justice Scalia disagreed with the Court’s characterization of how international 
materials were used in Roper. See id. at 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313. 
 96. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977). 
 97. Id. at 596 n.10 (noting that only three out of sixty countries surveyed by the United Nations 
imposed the death penalty where death did not ensue). 
 98. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316. 
 99. Id. at 317 n.21 (“[W]ithin the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes 
committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.”) (citation omitted). 
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Consideration of international materials as a confirmation of the 
Court’s decision has some advantages. First, there is a strong argument that 
by explicitly relegating such consideration to a subsidiary role, the Court 
properly focuses its inquiries on the treatment of the punishment in the 
United States. On a related note, by not introducing consideration of 
international materials into either of the other two inquiries, the Court does 
not “swell the denominator”100 in the consensus inquiry nor does it have its 
independent judgment improperly swayed by “like-minded foreigners.”101 
Finally, by only consulting international materials when they confirm a 
Court’s decision, there should be no possibility that the Court contravenes 
national views on the punishment at issue. 
The disadvantages, however, largely outweigh the advantages a 
confirmatory approach offers. First, there is a basic question of how much 
work such an inquiry actually does. As Professor Ernest A. Young has 
asked, “[w]ould a domestic conclusion that is not confirmed by foreign 
practice be insufficient to strike down a state law?”102 It seems unlikely that 
the Court would find a national consensus against a punishment, see no 
reason to uphold the punishment when exercising its independent 
judgment, and yet choose not to strike it down because international 
materials do not confirm the first two inquiries. Second, what precisely do 
international materials confirm under this approach? That is, this approach 
leaves open whether the Court should consider international materials to 
confirm objective indicia of consensus or its own exercise of independent 
judgment—or perhaps both.103 Finally, the Court arguably stacks the 
international deck if it is only to look to international materials when such 
materials confirm its decision. Justice Scalia has made this point 
repeatedly, by noting that in other areas of international and comparative 
 
 100. See Young, supra note 10, at 158-60. 
 101. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 102. Young, supra note 10, at 154 (emphasis in original). 
 103. Indeed, the Court’s two references to the confirmatory role of international materials in Roper 
do not make clear whether such materials confirm the consensus inquiry or the Court’s own 
independent judgment. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (“Our determination that the death penalty is 
disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the 
United States is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile 
death penalty.”) and id. at 578 (“The opinion of the world community, while not controlling our 
outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”). The first 
statement suggests that international materials explicitly contradict the U.S. position. The second does 
not indicate which conclusions—is it all of them?—international materials confirm. 
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law, consideration of international materials would explicitly disconfirm 
the Court’s conclusions.104 
*** 
In examining the ways international materials have been and can be 
incorporated into Eighth Amendment analysis, this Part has aimed at a 
clearer methodological understanding of how the Court can and does 
consider such materials. It starts from the assumption—admittedly 
controversial—that there is a place for such consideration in the analysis, 
and focuses on advantages and disadvantages inherent in the approaches 
the Court has taken and seems most likely to take in the future. Indeed, the 
methodological difficulties discussed here arguably provide a more 
concrete forum to debate the larger normative question on the role of 
international materials in American constitutional interpretation. 
In examining the three ways in which the Court has considered 
international materials, this Part arrives at the tentative conclusion that 
incorporating such materials as part of the exercise of its own independent 
judgment is the most defensible approach. Incorporating consideration of 
international materials in the exercise of the Court’s independent judgment 
allows for a nuanced inquiry that simply cannot be done under either the 
“objective indicia consensus” analysis or the “confirmatory” approach. 
Consideration of international materials in the “objective indicia of 
consensus” analysis risks aggregation and “denominator-swelling” 
problems whereas using such materials only to confirm a previous 
judgment adds little, if anything, to the overall inquiry. The most 
troublesome objection to considering international materials as part of the 
exercise of independent judgment is the concern with judicial cherry-
picking.105 The response to this objection is to develop a principled 
approach to how the Court—and courts—should consider international 
materials as part of the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment 
analysis. The next two Parts take up this task. 
 
 104. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 624-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that international practice 
does not confirm U.S. constitutional law in Fourth Amendment, Establishment Clause and abortion 
cases). 
 105. This critique of the selective use of international materials is analogous to that made of the 
selective use of legislative history. In both cases, an unprincipled judge can simply “look over the heads 
of the crowd and pick out . . . friends.” ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 36 (1997) (attributing quotation to Judge Harold Leventhal). There is a similar 
critique regarding the selective use of dictionaries to define terms. See generally Ellen P. Aprill, The 
Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 275 (1998); Rickie 
Sonpal, Old Dictionaries and New Textualists, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177 (2003). 
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III. METHOD II: TOWARDS A PRINCIPLED USE OF 
INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS IN EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
ANALYSIS 
The question unaddressed in Part II and taken up here centers on 
another methodological inquiry: assuming the Court will incorporate 
consideration of international materials into its analysis of the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, can it use such 
materials in a principled way? This Part borrows two proposals from recent 
scholarship to suggest a more principled way for the Court to use 
international materials in Eighth Amendment analysis. Finally, it closes by 
measuring the Court’s use of international materials in Roper against these 
principles. 
An initial caveat is important. Using international materials—that is, 
engaging in a close and thoughtful study of international and comparative 
legal documents—is very difficult to do well.106 Such difficulty should not 
necessarily dissuade the Court, but it should counsel caution in the use of 
such materials. Indeed, one scholar has argued that both decision costs—
”the time, effort, and expense involved in deciding cases in a particular 
way”—and error costs—”the likelihood of making mistakes by pursuing a 
particular method”—seem likely to plague American courts trying to make 
sense of international materials.107 This need not be the case, and the 
principles articulated here do not require courts to engage in the kind of 
complicated comparative work that some scholars have called for.108 
However, if the Court—and courts more generally—are unable to engage 
in a more thorough, principled consideration of international materials, 
there is a strong institutional competence argument weighing against such 
consideration. This Part briefly begins to sketch out what consideration of 
international materials might look like in the context of Eighth Amendment 
cases. 
A. International Acceptance in Law and Practice 
If courts assessing whether a given punishment in the U.S. is cruel and 
unusual look at both legislative enactments and—in the case of the death 
 
 106. For a sense of the difficulties involved in effectively understanding “global law,” see generally 
WILLIAM TWINING, GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING LAW FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 
(2009); WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL THEORY (2000). 
 107. See Young, supra note 10, at 165-66. 
 108. Cf. Lee, supra note 10, at 114 (“[T]he Court is unlikely to become the kind of thoughtful, 
sophisticated comparativist that engages with other legal systems envisioned by some scholars.”). Lee 
cites Vicki C. Jackson as an example of one such scholar. Id. 
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penalty—the actual practice of juries,109 foreign jurisdictions should be 
subject to the same scrutiny. Translated into a methodology for assessing 
international materials, the guidance for American courts is 
straightforward: courts should look both at how well-defined and accepted 
a given norm is in a foreign jurisdiction and the extent to which state 
practice in that jurisdiction actually conforms to the expressed legal 
commitment.110 Such an approach enriches the Court’s current “[n]ose-
counting”111 by delving more deeply into whether a given jurisdiction in 
fact adheres to the practice that it otherwise espouses. 
Nor should the research difficulties associated with determining state 
practice necessarily prove insurmountable. In addition to a rich body of 
comparative law scholarship,112 a number of organizations, including, 
Freedom House, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, focus 
considerable attention on state practice in areas of individual rights. These 
organizations have managed to collect data from jurisdictions whose own 
statistics do not inspire high degrees of confidence.113 In short, resources 
exist that allow courts to understand both law on the books in foreign 
jurisdictions and the extent to which such jurisdictions comply with these 
laws. If international materials are to be used in Eighth Amendment 
analysis, the Court should utilize these resources to look at both law and 
practice. It has, up to this point, focused on the former and largely—if not 
entirely—ignored the latter. 
B. United States’ Response to the International Norm 
A second step toward ensuring a principled use of international 
materials is for the Court to inquire more closely into whether the United 
States has accepted the relative international norm at issue.114 As Sarah 
Cleveland has noted, such acceptance could be ascertained by looking to 
four different areas: 1) treaty ratifications; 2) acceptance of treaties through 
 
 109. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822 (1988) (“[I]n confronting the question 
whether the youth of the defendant . . . is a sufficient reason for denying the State the power to sentence 
him to death, we first review relevant legislative enactments, then refer to jury determinations.”). 
 110. Cf. Cleveland, supra note 10, at 113. 
 111. See Young, supra note 10, at 153. 
 112. See, e.g., TWINING, supra, note 106 and sources cited therein. 
 113. A snapshot of Human Rights Watch’s website in May 2010 provides a useful exmaple. At that 
time, Human Rights Watch had recently conducted studies of the persecution of Kurds in Syria, alleged 
witchcraft and sorcery cases in Saudi Arabia, sham trials of human rights activists in China and an 
assessment of the National Security Law in Sudan. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org 
(last visited May 5, 2010). 
 114. See Cleveland, supra note 10, at 115-24. 
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customary international law;115 3) international customary laws to which 
the U.S. has not persistently objected; and 4) jus cogens norms.116 By 
contrast, the U.S. should be understood to have rejected an international 
norm through a treaty reservation or through persistent objection.117 
A somewhat more difficult factor here is the United States’ decision 
not to ratify a treaty. While such a decision is a clear signal of the U.S.’s 
intention not to consent to the treaty, it does not necessarily always entail a 
rejection of the norms embodied in the treaty. For example, while five 
senators on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations acknowledged 
pervasive human rights violations against women throughout the world and 
expressed an interest in seeing such violations ended, they recommended 
against ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”) because they did not believe 
that CEDAW was “a proper or effective means of pursuing that objective.” 
118 Indeed, the Committee as a whole did recommend ratification, but it did 
not pass the Senate.119 A court considering such a treaty as part of a 
consideration of international materials could, ceteris paribus, count it as a 
neutral factor. 
While such an inquiry properly respects the role of the political 
branches in the interpretative process,120 assessing the U.S.’s acceptance of 
a norm in the Eighth Amendment context should not be treated by courts as 
dispositive—at least under the “independent judgment” inquiry.121 By 
looking to how, or indeed if, the Legislative and Executive branches have 
responded to an international norm, courts avoid the critique that they are 
doing an end-run around the political process. Indeed, a court should 
include the U.S.’s acceptance or rejection of the international norm as part 
of its inquiry into objective indicia of consensus,122 especially considering 
 
 115. Cleveland gives as examples the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and aspects of the 
Law of the Sea Convention. See id. at 115. 
 116. Id. Jus cogens norms refer to peremptory rules of international law from which no derogation 
is permitted. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 121 (6th ed. 2003). 
 117. Cleveland, supra note 10, at 115. 
 118. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 103D CONG., EXEC. REP. (1994) S384-10 
reprinted in HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, 
POLITICS, MORALS 207 (2d ed. 2000). 
 119. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 118, at 208. 
 120. See Cleveland, supra note 10, at 116. 
 121. See supra Part II.B. 
 122. Asking an American court to consider whether American legislatures, executives and courts 
have accepted or rejected an alleged international norm as part of the objective indicia of consensus is 
distinct from asking an American court to consider foreign jurisdictions as part of the objective indicia 
analysis. Although, as noted supra Part II.A, American courts are ill-equipped to tackle the latter 
analysis, they regularly interpret the actions of American institutions. 
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that such a statement would clearly address whether such consensus 
existed. At the same time, in a situation where foreign jurisdictions as well 
as international treaty and customary law have established a norm that the 
American political branches have rejected, a court would not be restricted 
from considering such materials as part of the independent judgment 
inquiry under the Eighth Amendment analysis.123 
However a court comes out, it should fully and transparently identify 
how the U.S. has responded to an international norm. Further, a court 
should explain how the U.S. position—acceptance, rejection or something 
in between—factors into its own decision. As noted above, if a court is 
unable or unwilling to engage in this type of analysis, consideration of 
international materials is arguably best excluded. 
C. Principles in Action: A Brief Application to Roper 
Applying the two principles articulated here, it is apparent that the 
Court’s use of international materials in Roper falls short of the mark. Such 
a conclusion does not imply that international materials should not have 
been considered; rather, it suggests that the Court should have done a more 
effective job of using and explaining its use of such materials. 
The Court in Roper included no discussion of whether countries that 
have legislatively abolished the death penalty as applied to juvenile 
offenders actually adhere to these laws in practice. Justice Scalia rightfully 
criticizes the Court on this point; indeed he even provides a citation for his 
supposition that a number of the countries that have putatively proscribed 
the penalty in fact use it in practice.124 The “weight of the authority”125 on 
this point is almost certainly with the Court,126 but it fails to communicate 
this effectively when it does not adequately consider state practice in 
foreign jurisdictions alongside its consideration of international law “on the 
books.” 
Additionally, the Court’s treatment of the U.S. response to the two 
relevant treaties—the International Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights (“ICCPR”) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 
 123. See Cleveland, supra note 10, at 118. Cleveland notes in particular that with norms that 
construe limits on governmental power—generally understood as “countermajoritarian constraints on 
the political branches”—courts owe less judicial deference to those branches.  See id. at 117. 
 124. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 552, 623 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing RITA J. SIMON & 
DAGNY A. BLASKOVICH, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: STATUTES, POLICIES, 
FREQUENCIES, AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES THE WORLD OVER (2002)). 
 125. Id. at 578 (majority opinion). 
 126. Indeed, this is evident from the very study Justice Scalia cites. See generally SIMON & 
BLASKOVICH, supra note 124. 
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(“CRC”)—leaves much to be desired. While the Court does acknowledge 
that the U.S. made a reservation to the ICCPR’s prohibition on capital 
punishment for juveniles in Article 6(5),127 it then claims that the 
reservation is largely immaterial on account of both five U.S states having 
abolished the death penalty for juveniles and subsequent Congressional 
action unrelated to the ICCPR.128 While such events may be relevant for the 
domestic consensus inquiry, the Court’s implicit suggestion that such 
actions somehow cancelled the reservation is both misleading and, from an 
international law perspective, simply incorrect.129 Moreover, the Court’s 
emphasis on the fact that other countries have not entered reservations on 
the capital punishment provision in the CRC obscures the important point 
that the U.S. have entered such a reservation to the relevant provision in the 
ICCPR.130 The U.S.’s specific rejection of the prohibition on capital 
punishment pursuant to its ICCPR reservation need not determine the 
Court’s conclusion in Roper, but the Court must make a better effort at 
forthrightly explaining why it does not. 
Finally, the Court’s passing reference to the CRC does not adequately 
explain why a treaty that the U.S. has not ratified is worthy of the Court’s 
attention. If the Court points to the CRC as objective indicia of consensus, 
Justice Scalia’s obvious rejoinder that the U.S. has explicitly not joined 
such consensus seems fatal.131 But this would not be so if the Court were to 
explain that non-ratification does not necessarily imply rejection of the 
norm at issue132 and that in any case, the overwhelming number of 
countries that have signed onto (and not entered reservations on) the CRC 
and its prohibition of capital punishment for juveniles is relevant to the 
Court’s exercise of its independent judgment. This may indeed not have 
been the Court’s reasoning; the point here is to emphasize the Court’s 
failure to flesh out its reasoning on the relevance of the U.S.’s non-
ratification of the CRC. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS APPLIED TO GRAHAM V. 
FLORIDA 
With the Graham and Sullivan cases, the Court had the opportunity to 
elucidate the proper role of international materials in Eighth Amendment 
 
 127. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 567. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See LORI DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 477 (4th ed. 
2001). See also Roper, 543 U.S. at 622-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 130. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 576. 
 131. Id. at 622 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 132. See supra Part III.B. 
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cases. For some justices, of course, this means no role at all.133 But for 
those convinced that there is a role for international materials in the Eighth 
Amendment analysis, this Part applies the principled use of such materials 
developed in Part III to the Graham case.134 This application leads to two 
conclusions. First, it is clear the juvenile LWOP sentence is widely 
proscribed in law and practice. Second, the political branches of the United 
States have repeatedly opted out of the relevant international treaties and 
treaty provisions prohibiting the juvenile LWOP sentence. On balance, 
then, the use of international materials on the question of whether the 
juvenile LWOP sentence should be held unconstitutional stands in 
equipoise. While such a minimal contribution to the final result in the 
Graham case may seem unsatisfactory, an analysis that lends clarity to how 
international materials will be used in Eighth Amendment cruel and 
unusual punishment cases would prove of great methodological use over 
the longer term. 
A. The Law and Practice of the Juvenile LWOP Sentence 
Dissenting in Roper to the majority’s use of international materials, 
Justice Scalia noted that while the Court’s decision invalidated the death 
penalty, it left in the place the similarly prohibited juvenile LWOP 
sentence.135 Indeed, if anything, the juvenile LWOP sentence appears even 
more widely proscribed than the juvenile death penalty.136 Importantly, this 
proscription is captured in both law and practice. 
The international community’s rejection of the juvenile LWOP 
sentence appears in two widely ratified international treaties and a couple 
of recent United Nations General Assembly resolutions. First, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) specifically refers to, and 
condemns, the practice in Article 37(a).137 Moreover, Article 37(b) 
provides that any incarceration of juveniles “shall be used only as a 
 
 133. This would be particularly true of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas. See supra note 14. 
 134. As noted, Sullivan v. Florida was dismissed as improvidently granted. See supra note 2. 
 135. Roper, 543 U.S. at 623 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is also worth noting that, in addition to 
barring the execution of under-18 offenders, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
prohibits punishing them with life in prison without the possibility of release.”). 
 136. See generally Connie De La Vega & Michelle Leighton, Sentencing Our Children to Die in 
Prison: Global Law and Practice, 42 U.S.F.  L. REV. 983 (2008) (surveying the global use of the 
juvenile LWOP sentence). 
 137. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37(a), Nov. 30, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. The 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, which is tasked with overseeing implementation of the CRC, 
added a General Comment in 2007 clarifying the prohibition: “The death penalty and a life sentence 
without parole are explicitly prohibited under article 37(a) of CRC.” Comm. on the Rights of the Child, 
Children’s Rights in Juvenile Justice, General Comment No. 10, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/10 (Apr. 
25, 2007). 
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measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.”138 
All members of the United Nations except for Somalia and the United 
States have ratified the CRC, and only a handful of those that have ratified 
the CRC have made a reservation to Article 37.139 Second, provisions of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)140 have 
been read to disallow the juvenile LWOP sentence. In particular, 
commentators have emphasized the requirement in Article 14(4) that states 
shall take into account a juvenile’s age when applying criminal sanctions141 
alongside the language in Article 9(1) that “[n]o one shall be deprived of 
his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure 
as are established by law”142 to reach the result that the ICCPR prohibits 
the juvenile LWOP sentence.143 Other commentators have looked to the 
Article 7 prohibition on cruel, degrading or inhumane punishment144 as 
well as the requirement in Article 10(3) that “[j]uvenile offenders shall be 
segregated from adults and be accorded treatment appropriate to their age 
and legal status.”145 Finally, the United Nations General Assembly has 
twice recently passed overwhelming resolutions which in part condemned 
the practice of juvenile LWOP sentences; the resolution carried 185 votes 
in 2006 and 183 votes in 2007.146 In both cases, only the United States 
opposed the resolutions.147 
In addition to the international law consensus against the juvenile 
LWOP sentence, the law and practice of foreign jurisdictions indicates the 
juvenile LWOP sentence is only in use in the United States.148 A 2005 
survey conducted by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International 
 
 138. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37(b), Nov. 30, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 139. See United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention on the Rights of the Child, http:// 
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2010). Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Singapore, and Switzerland have entered reservations. In all but two cases, these reservations are to Art. 
37(c)’s requirement to avoid mixing children with adult detainees. 
 140. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 
(1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 141. Id. at art. 14(4). 
 142. Id. at art. 9(1). 
 143. See Vincent G. Levy, Note, Enforcing International Norms in the United States After Roper v. 
Simmons: The Case of Juvenile Offenders Sentenced to Life Without Parole, 45 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 262, 270-71 (2007). 
 144. ICCPR, supra note 140, at art. 7. 
 145. Id. at art. 10(3).  For this argument, see De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 136, at 1010. 
 146. Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 62/141, ¶ 36(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/141 (Dec. 18, 2007); 
Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 61/146, ¶ 31(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/146 (Dec. 19, 2006). 
 147. See De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 136, at 1012. 
 148. Id. at 985. 
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indicated that only fourteen countries permitted a juvenile LWOP 
sentence—and it was not even clear whether “life” necessarily foreclosed 
the possibility of parole.149 More recent research suggests that in fact only 
ten countries other than the United States permit the penalty.150 Looking at 
the actual practice of juvenile LWOP sentences, the 2005 survey identified 
only three countries other than the United States where juvenile offenders 
are actually serving such sentences: South Africa, Tanzania and Israel.151 
Updating this research through communications with officials in every 
country where the juvenile LWOP sentence is possible, Professors Connie 
de La Vega and Michelle Leighton found that as of 2008, no juvenile 
offenders were serving a life without the possibility of parole sentence.152 
Even if this exhaustive study failed to identify a country that in fact has 
sentenced a juvenile offender to LWOP, it is clear that the overwhelming 
number of foreign jurisdictions disfavor the use of the juvenile LWOP 
sentence in both law and practice. 
B. The United States’ Response to International Prohibition on Juvenile 
LWOP Sentences 
The United States’ response to the international prohibition on the 
juvenile LWOP sentence has been largely uniform: explicit disagreement. 
This position is clearly articulated in a series of reservations to the ICCPR. 
First, the Senate explicitly defined cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment 
in Article 7 of the ICCPR as synonymous with “cruel and unusual 
punishment” as captured in the U.S. Constitution.153 Second, while noting 
that “the policy and practice of the United States are generally in 
compliance with and supportive of the Covenant’s provisions regarding 
treatment of juveniles in the criminal justice system,” the Senate reserved 
to the United States “the right, in exceptional circumstances, to treat 
juveniles as adults, notwithstanding [contrary ICCPR treaty provisions].”154 
In carving these reservations out of the ICCPR, the Senate made clear that 
the United States remained free to use the juvenile LWOP sentence, albeit 
 
 149. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE 
WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 106 (2005) [hereinafter HRW & AI]. 
 150. MICHELLE LEIGHTON & CONNIE DE LA VEGA, SENTENCING OUR CHILDREN TO DIE IN 
PRISON: GLOBAL LAW AND PRACTICE 4 (2007); see also De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 136, at 
990. The ten countries are Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Belize, Brunei, Cuba, Dominica, 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Solomon Islands, and Sri Lanka. Cf. HRW & AI, supra note 149, 
at 106-07. 
 151. HRW & AI, supra note 149, at 106. 
 152. De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 136, at 985. 
 153. 138 CONG. REC. S. 4781 (1992). 
 154. Id. at 4783. 
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in “exceptional circumstances.”155 More recently, the United States twice 
opposed United Nations General Assembly resolutions calling in part for 
the abolition of the LWOP sentence for juvenile offenders.156 
As noted above, a slightly more difficult inquiry is how to assess the 
United States’ decision not to ratify the CRC.157 Most basically, the United 
States has no treaty obligation requiring it not to use the juvenile LWOP 
sentence.158 A number of commentators have argued that the abolition of 
the juvenile LWOP sentence has now risen to the level of customary 
international law,159 and would thus bind the United States notwithstanding 
the fact that it has not ratified the CRC.160 Even if this is the case, it does 
not reveal anything about the United States’ decision not to ratify the CRC. 
While a number of reasons underlie the political branches’ decision not to 
ratify the CRC,161 the most relevant objection to ratification relating to the 
juvenile LWOP sentence is based in concerns about federalism. 
Examining why the United States chose not to ratify the CRC reveals 
a strong concern with preserving states’ control over a body of law 
traditionally understood to fall within their ambit.162 Most broadly, “[t]he 
CRC touches on many aspects of family law and juvenile justice that have 
customarily been regulated by the states and not the federal 
 
 155. Id. The Human Rights Committee, which oversees implementation of the ICCPR, recently 
suggested that the United States’ practice of juvenile LWOP rendered it non-compliant with article 24 
of the ICCPR notwithstanding its reservation. See Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports 
Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant:  Concluding Observations of the Human 
Rights Committee, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2006).  Commentators have 
interpreted these observations to mean that “[t]he extraordinary breadth and rapid development in the 
United States of sentencing child offenders to LWOP since the United States’ ratification of the ICCPR 
contradicts the assertion that the United States has applied this sentence only in exceptional 
circumstances.” De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 136, at 1010. 
 156. See supra note 146. 
 157. See supra Part III.B. 
 158. See CRC, supra note 137, at art. 37(a). 
 159. See, e.g., De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 136, at 1013-18; Levy, supra note 143, at 276 
(“Ultimately, the view that Article 37(a) [of the CRC] is binding upon the United States by virtue of its 
crystallization into a norm of customary law is more than just colorable.”). 
 160. The reach of customary international law and the extent of its applicability in federal court in 
the United States are well beyond the scope of this Note. For a recent discussion, see generally Ernest 
A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365 (2002). 
For an argument that a country should be able to opt-out of customary international law, see generally 
Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202 (2010). 
 161. See Lainie Rutkow & Joshua T. Lozman, Suffer the Children?: A Call for the United States 
Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 161, 
173-80 (2006) (describing objections to ratification of the CRC as rooted in concerns about sovereignty, 
federalism, reproductive and family planning, and parents’ rights). 
 162. See Susan Kilbourne, Student Research, The Convention on the Rights of the Child: 
Federalism Issues for the United States, 5 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 327, 327 (1998). 
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government.”163 More specifically, an objection to ratification centered on 
uninhibited state autonomy to sentence juvenile offenders.164 And while the 
Court’s decision in Roper indeed rendered moot the need to protect a 
state’s right to permit the death penalty for juvenile offenders, the decision 
specifically left unaddressed—and arguably seemed to endorse—the 
juvenile LWOP sentence.165 In light of the existing ICCPR reservations166 
and the opposition votes to the recent U.N. General Assembly 
resolutions,167 the United States’ ongoing refusal to ratify the CRC should 
be seen to include a rejection of the strong international consensus against 
the juvenile LWOP sentence. 
*** 
Taken together, the two prongs of the proposed analysis of 
international materials do not place much of a thumb on the scale in the 
Graham case. Although the survey of law and practice in foreign 
jurisdictions weighs heavily in favor of a decision that prohibits the 
juvenile LWOP sentence, the United States’ persistent expression of 
disagreement with this international consensus amounts to a strong 
counterweight. The resultant stasis—had this been the Court’s analysis in 
this case—would, however, have been far from uninformative. It would 
have shed considerable light on the methodological questions underlying 
the normative debate about the use of international materials in 
constitutional interpretation—at least as applied to the Eighth Amendment 
cruel and unusual punishment analysis. 
V. A MISSED OPPORTUNITY: INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS IN 
GRAHAM V. FLORIDA 
 When, however, the Court was presented the opportunity to clarify 
the role of international materials in Eighth Amendment analysis in the 
Graham case, it let the opportunity slip away. In deciding that the juvenile 
LWOP sentence for non-homicide offenders is unconstitutional, the Court 
devoted a brief section of its opinion in Graham to considering how 
 
 163. Rutkow & Lozman, supra note 161, at 177. 
 164. See Howard Davidson, A Model Child Protection Legal Reform Instrument: The Convention 
on the Rights of the Child and its Consistency with United States Law, 5 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & 
POL’Y 185, 187 (1998). 
 165. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005) (“To the extent the juvenile death penalty might 
have residual deterrent effects, it is worth noting that the punishment of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction, in particular for a young person.”). 
 166. See supra note 153 & 154. 
 167. See supra note 145 & 146. 
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international materials “support [its] conclusion.”168 Not only did this 
section fail to explicitly address the methodological question of how to use 
international materials in Eighth Amendment analysis, it also used such 
materials in the unprincipled manner that has troubled critics.169 This 
missed opportunity means that debate about the proper role of international 
materials in Eighth Amendment—and by extension domestic 
constitutional—analysis will almost certainly continue. 
The Court’s analysis proceeded along similar lines to the death 
penalty cases reviewed above.170 It began by invoking the language from 
Trop of “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society,”171 and then determined that the proper analysis for the 
“categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence” presented in Graham 
was the two-step review: objective indicia of consensus and the exercise of 
independent judgment. 172 Importantly, in determining that imposition of 
the juvenile LWOP sentence was “exceedingly rare,”173 the Court clarified 
that this first step concentrated on the “objective indicia of national 
consensus.”174 Accordingly, the Court only looked at domestic legislation 
and domestic sentencing practices.175 In explaining why the “judicial 
exercise of independent judgment”176 also led to the conclusion that the 
juvenile LWOP sentence is unconstitutional, the Court relied on many of 
the same factors it considered in Roper: lessened culpability of juveniles,177 
the harsh nature of the punishment as applied to juveniles,178 and the 
weakened case for both retribution179 and deterrence as applied to 
juveniles.180 After a brief section justifying a categorical prohibition 
against—as opposed to a case-by-case determination of the appropriateness 
of—the juvenile LWOP sentence,181 the Court turned its attention to 
international materials. 
 
 168. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010). 
 169. See id.; see also supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 170. See supra Part III. 
 171. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021 (citations omitted). 
 172. Id. at 2022. For a discussion of the two step process, see supra Part III. 
 173. Id. at 2026. 
 174. Id. at 2023 (emphasis added). 
 175. See id. at 2023-26. 
 176. Id. at 2026. 
 177. Id. at 2026; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). 
 178. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027-28; Roper, 543 U.S. at 572. 
 179. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028; Roper, 543 U.S. at 571. 
 180. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028-29; Roper, 543 U.S. at 571-72. 
 181. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030-34. 
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Before discussing how international materials affect the outcome in 
Graham, the Court justified its use of such materials by reference to the 
line of cases discussed above.182 Noting that “the Court has looked beyond 
our Nation’s borders for support for its independent conclusion that a 
particular punishment is cruel and unusual,” the majority cited Roper, 
Atkins, Thompson, Enmund, Coker, and Trop.183 Indeed, in language that 
further suggests that the use of international materials has codified into a 
methodological precedent for Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual 
punishment analysis,184 the Court described its interest in “the global 
consensus against [the juvenile LWOP] sentencing practice” as a 
continuation of “that longstanding practice” of looking to international 
materials.185 
Unfortunately, the Court’s consideration of international materials 
fails to elucidate the role such materials properly play. It should first be 
noted that the Court limits its use of international materials to that of 
confirming its decision.186 As in Roper, the structure of the opinion187 and 
the majority’s careful prose suggests that international materials function to 
confirm the Court’s conclusion; the Court specifically notes that 
international materials do not “control [its] decision,” but rather “support 
[its] conclusion.”188 Indeed, the Court specifically cites Roper to support its 
claim that “international opinion” against the juvenile LWOP sentence 
“provide[s] respected and significant confirmation for our own 
conclusions.”189 This confirmatory approach restricts consideration of 
international materials to only those instances where the Court has in 
essence already made up its mind, raising the basic question of why it 
should bother discussing what foreign jurisdictions have to say about the 
issue.190 
 
 182. See supra Part II. 
 183. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033. 
 184. See supra Part I.B. 
 185. Graham, 130 Sup. Ct. at 2033. 
 186. See supra Part II.C for a discussion of the confirmatory role of international materials. 
 187. Part III of Graham includes four subsections. Subsection A considers objective indicia of 
national consensus; subsection B presents the Court’s exercise of independent judgment; subsection C 
justifies the use of a categorical rule; and subsection D considers international materials. See 130 Sup. 
Ct. at 2023-34. This structure suggests the consideration of international materials stands apart from the 
Court’s standard two-step analysis discussed supra Part III. Cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 564-78 
(considering objective indicia of consensus and independent judgment in Part III and the role of 
international materials in Part IV). 
 188. Graham, 130 Sup. Ct. at 2033. 
 189. Id. at 2034 (alterations omitted) (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 578). 
 190. See supra notes 101-103 and accompanying text. 
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More troubling, however, is the Court’s failure to use international 
materials in a principled manner: while it does consider the juvenile LWOP 
sentence in law and practice, it fails to consider the political branches’ 
response to the international norm. The majority opinion begins by 
surveying the number of foreign jurisdictions that still permit the juvenile 
LWOP sentence, and accurately identifies that only ten countries in 
addition to the United States allow the sentence in their law.191 Moreover, it 
looks beyond law on the books to note that in practice, the United States is 
the only country that appears to impose the juvenile LWOP sentence.192 
The Court then refers to the CRC’s prohibition of the juvenile LWOP 
sentence,193 and in the process refers to the United States’ non-ratification 
of that treaty.194 In addition to failing to elaborate on the significance of the 
United States’ non-ratification of the CRC, however, the Court does not 
discuss the United States’ repeated opposition to the development of an 
international norm prohibiting the juvenile LWOP sentence. Additionally, 
it does not address the reservations to the ICCPR or the recent no-votes in 
the U.N. General Assembly resolutions seeking to abolish the juvenile 
LWOP sentence.195 Instead, the Court devotes the final two paragraphs of 
this brief section to first restating the confirmatory role international 
materials play196 and then dismissing as irrelevant197  the debate as to 
whether a binding jus cogens norm against the juvenile LWOP sentence 
exists.198 
A word about the Court’s final sentence in this section is appropriate. 
As though to assuage critics who will argue the Court has once again relied 
on the opinions of “like-minded foreigners”199 in reaching its decision, the 
Court repeats that international materials do not bind or control, but are 
useful in showing that “the Court’s rationale has respected reasoning to 
support it.”200 If the Court does have “respected reasoning” supporting its 
 
 191. Graham, 130 Sup. Ct. at 2033 (citing Leighton & De La Vega, supra note 136). 
 192. Id. at 2034. 
 193. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 137, at art. 37(a). 
 194. Graham, 130 Sup. Ct. at 2034. 
 195. See supra notes 143, 153 and accompanying text. 
 196. Graham, 130 Sup. Ct. at 2034. 
 197. Id. 
 198. The Court might have justified its consideration of international materials in part on the basis 
that in the exercise of its independent judgment, it found the prohibition of the juvenile LWOP sentence 
to be a jus cogens norm. See supra notes 116 & 122. It did not do so. 
 199. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 200. Graham, 130 Sup. Ct. at 2034. 
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decision, however, it fails to make this clear in its opinion.201 The mere fact 
that foreign jurisdictions have abolished the juvenile LWOP sentences says 
nothing about why they have chosen to do so.202 The Court offers no 
discussion of the reasoning underlying foreign jurisdictions’ decisions to 
proscribe the juvenile LWOP sentence. Even assuming reference to the 
“persuasive reasoning” of a foreign jurisdiction is an appropriate way to 
use international materials,203 the Court has merely shown that foreign 
jurisdictions have stopped using the juvenile LWOP sentence, not the 
reasoning driving those decisions. 
Finally, two references in Justice Thomas’s dissent illustrate how the 
Court’s use of international materials in Graham perpetuates the confusion 
about the proper role such materials should play in Eighth Amendment 
analysis. First, in critiquing the majority’s use of the objective indicia of 
national consensus, Justice Thomas counts as one of the metrics the Court 
looks to “state and federal legislation, jury behavior, and (surprisingly, 
given that we are talking about ‘national’ consensus) international 
opinion.”204 Despite the Court’s effort to underscore its use of international 
materials as providing “respected reasoning”205 to “support [its] 
conclusion,”206 Justice Thomas clearly sees the use of such materials as 
skewing the objective indicia inquiry—what some scholars would see as 
another example of “denominator swelling.”207 Not only do the majority 
and dissent disagree about the use of international materials; they also 
disagree about how such materials are being used methodologically in the 
opinion itself. 
Second, Justice Thomas also evinces concern that the majority 
unjustifiably relies on global practice regarding the juvenile LWOP 
sentence while ignoring the fact that eleven countries continue to have the 
punishment established in their laws.208 This critique, of course, inverts that 
 
 201. See Sitaraman, supra note 10, at 676 (“Persuasive reasoning involves a judge considering the 
argumentation or logic of a foreign decision and using that argument in his decision.”). 
 202. See id. at 677 (“In cases of persuasive reasoning, the court must of course pay close attention 
to the internal logic of the opinion. But it is also crucial that the court consider the context surrounding 
the foreign case. The texts of the provisions interpreted might be different, the foreign country’s core 
values might differ, and the politics of the foreign country may have been instrumental in shaping the 
outcome of the decision.”). 
 203. See generally id. at 670-77 (identifying the use of persuasive reasoning from foreign 
jurisdictions as a “potentially problematic” way to use international materials). 
 204. Graham, 130 Sup. Ct. at 2045 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 205. Id. at 2034 (majority opinion). 
 206. Id. at 2033. 
 207. See Young, supra note 10, at 158-60. 
 208. Graham, 130 Sup. Ct. at 2053 n.12 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[D]espite the Court’s attempt to 
count the actual number of juvenile nonhomicide offenders serving life-without-parole sentences in 
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articulated by Justice Scalia in dissent in Roper: foreign countries may have 
laws prohibiting a certain practice, but these laws signify little if they do 
not actually adhere to such laws in practice.209 As this Note has argued, the 
response is that both law and practice matter.210 In failing to explain, 
however, that it relies both on the relatively low number of jurisdictions 
that retain the juvenile LWOP sentence in law and on the fact that only one 
of these jurisdictions—the United States—actually imposes the sentence in 
practice,211 the Court leaves the impression—at least for the Graham (and 
Roper) dissenters—that it will selectively use the law or practice of foreign 
jurisdictions to make its point. A simple statement by the Court that it 
draws on both law and practice as part of its consideration of international 
materials would both clarify the proper analysis and illustrate that such 
analysis proceeds in a predictable and principled manner. 
*** 
The upshot of the Court’s brief discussion of international materials in 
Graham—and the dissent’s even briefer response—is that confusion about 
the proper role of international materials in Eighth Amendment analysis 
persists. This is an unfortunate situation, especially given that Graham 
presented the Court with an ideal opportunity to tackle this thorny question 
head-on. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether American courts should consider international materials 
when interpreting the U.S. Constitution will likely be debated for years to 
come. This Note has largely abstained from staking out a position in this 
debate. Instead, starting from the observation that the Supreme Court has in 
fact considered international materials as part of its analysis of the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, the Note aims 
both to make sense of and refine the Court’s methodological approach to 
using such materials. 
Indeed, better understanding of how the Court has incorporated 
consideration of international materials into the Eighth Amendment 
analysis, and how it might use those materials in a principled way, may 
 
other nations . . . the laws of other countries permit juvenile life-without-parole sentences.”) (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
 209. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 623 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is interesting that 
. . . the Court is quite willing to believe that every foreign nation—of whatever tyrannical political 
makeup and with however subservient or incompetent a court system—in fact adheres to a rule of no 
death penalty for offenders under 18.”) (emphasis in original). 
 210. See supra Part III.A. 
 211. De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 136, at 985. 
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elucidate the normative arguments about the propriety of using such 
materials in the first place. This Note’s normative claim is relatively 
modest: if an American court is to use international materials when 
determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual under the Eighth 
Amendment, it should use such materials in a principled manner, or not use 
them at all. At a minimum, principled use involves considering not only the 
law on the books in foreign jurisdictions but also state practice. Likewise, 
to use international materials in a principled way under the Eighth 
Amendment, a court should confront head-on the United States’ response 
to the international norm at issue, and explain what conclusions it draws 
from that response. Although the Graham case provided a vehicle through 
which such methodological clarification was possible, none was 
forthcoming. While the Graham decision does indicate that the use of 
international materials in Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment 
is appropriate, it offers meager guidance on how such materials should be 
used. 
Agreement on the propriety of using international materials to 
interpret the American Constitution seems unlikely. But surely it is 
uncontroversial to acknowledge that if courts are to use such materials in 
Eighth Amendment analysis, they should do so well. This Note suggests a 
methodological framework for such an analysis. 
 
